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2 years ago in Philosophy , Philosophy of Mind By Keshav Verma
In light of modern neuroscience, which appears to detect brain activity preceding conscious decisions, how can philosophers still defend a robust notion of free will?
The classic challenge from neuroscience (e.g., Libet, Soon et al.) seems to show that unconscious brain processes initiate actions before we're consciously aware of 'deciding.' This is often taken to disprove free will. What are the main philosophical counter-arguments? Do they involve redefining free will (compatibilism), questioning the interpretation of the neuroscience (e.g., the 'readiness potential' may not be a decision), or challenging the underlying assumptions about consciousness and agency? I need a clear map of the defensive strategies.
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By Govind Answered 10 months ago
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